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Chapter 6
Simulating Benefit Levels Under
Alternative Social Security Reforms
Gordon P Goodfellow and Sylvester J. Schieber

Proposals to reform the U.S. social security retirement program can arrayed
along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum would be a continuation of
the existing program, structured as it is today, financed on a mostly pay-asyou-go basis and with benefits that are redistributive based on lifetime earnings. For example, Robert Myers (1997a and b), former chief actuary of
social security, advocates keeping the system essentially in its cUl'rent form
with some relatively minor modifications. To finance promised benefits, he
would increase the payroll tax on both workers and employers by 0.30 percent of covered wages in 2015, and by similar amounts in 2020, 2025, and
2030. To the extent that further changes would be required to keep the
program solvent, he advocates that the age of eligibility for benefits be
increased. At the other end of the spectrum would be virtually total withdrawal of the government from playing any role in individual workers' retirement accumulation or provision.
In practice, few would advocate that the U.S. government withdraw completely from its role in assuring the retirement security of its citizens. Even
the strongest advocates of individual choice in these matters are concerned
about potential free-rider problems that could arise if the government did
not require workers to make some provision for their own retirement needs.
For example, Feldstein and Samwick (1997) proposed a system of mandatory Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) that would replace social security benefits. This proposal would significantly change the government's
current role in securing and delivering retirement benefits, though PRA
participation would be mandated by the government. This PRA system
would still be supported by a safety net of welfare programs like the Supplemental Security Income system and food stamps.
Between these two end-points along the social security policy spectrum,
several intermediate proposals have been suggested (see Chapter 1, this
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volume). These are often characterized as privatization proposals, although
they include varying degrees of funding, dependence on private financial
markets, and personal retirement accounts. For example, the last Advisory
Council on Social Security report (1997) described the Individual Account
(IA) option as one where workers would contribute 1.6 percent of covered
payroll to a mandatory savings program to be administered by the Social
Security Administration (SSA). As these personal accounts grew, conventional social security benefits would be curtailed somewhat. SSA would operate the mandatory savings program much like a national 401 (k) plan, with a
limited number of investment options across which workers could allocate
their contributions and accumulating assets. At retirement, the accumulated assets would be converted to annuities. This IA proposal would give
workers greater control and flexibility than the system as modified according to Myers, so it would go some distance along the privatization spectrum.
Under the IA plan, however, the government would still mandate contribution rates, manage all the assets of the system including those in the personal accounts, and require the annuitization of benefits at retirement.
Hence, the extent of privatization in this proposal would still be extremely
limited.
A second Advisory Council proposal, dubbed the Personal Security Account (PSA) option, would require workers to invest 5 percent of covered
earnings now paid to social security. This option would allow workers to
manage the investment of their retirement assets with much greater discretion than under the IA plan. It would not require that PSA accumulations be
annuitized (or at least not be annuitized above certain base retirement
income levels). This plan calls for even larger cuts in social security benefits
than the IA plan. Because the PSA proposal would give individual workers
more opportunity to make personal choices, it would go further along the
"privatization spectrum" than the IA proposal.
Other reform proposals can be classified along the privatization spectrum, based on their curtailment of benefits provided directly through
social security and the degree of personal choice they allow workers in
managing some of their own retirement accumulations. For example, the
Committee on Economic Development, an association of private business
executives, has a proposal positioned along the privatization spectrum between the Advisory Council's IA and PSA proposals (CED 1997). This is
because it calls for greater curtailment of social security's traditional benefits than the former, but less than the latter. It also calls for a mandatory 3
percent of pay mandatory contribution that would go to a personal account.
It would give workers some discretion in how their money was invested, but
would require annuitization at retirement.
Proponents of social security reform frequently develop comparative
analyses showing the provision of retirement benefits under current law and
under the proposed reform option. Typically, the projected asset accumula-
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tions of individual wOl'kers under reform options that include personal
accounts are based on historical long-term real rates of return for various
classes of assets, assuming that workers would invest in "standardized" portfolios during their working careers. It is not uncommon for proponents of
reform to calculate potential benefits under personal account options by
assuming rates of return equivalent to historical mean or median rates of
return on the assumed portfolios (see Carter and Shipman 1996; Feldstein
and Samwick 1997; Advisory Council 1997) .
Opponents of personal social security accounts are often critical of the
projected benefits estimated to flow from such plans for two rea~ons. First,
they argue that the stylized portfolios are not representative oflikely investment patterns across the income spectrum. In particular, they suggest that
lower-wage workers have largely been left out of 40 I (k) plans to date, have
little investment experience, and might invest far more conservatively than
the standardized portfolio. Second, they argue that the presentation of
"typical" or average results obscures the range of outcomes that might be
expected under such proposals. Both of these criticisms are examined in
this chapter using a simulation model.

401 (kJ Participant Investment Patterns
To assess how workers direct the investment of their own retirement savings,
we analyze administrative record files for 80 employer-sponsored 40 I (k)
plans at the end of 1995. These plans are selected randomly, and hence are
not necessarily representative of the universe of 401 (k) plans. However,
there is no reason to believe that these plans are atypical of patterns of
investment behavior in plans of this sort.'
Our analysis of 401 (k) investment patterns considers only the asset allocation patterns of employee contributions, since we are interested in workers'
investment behavior. In addition, the investment options for employer cont1ibutions are more likely to be restricted to specific assets, most notably to
employer stock. The analysis does not adjust workers' investment behavior
to account for the fact that, in some plans, employer contributions are
directed almost entirely to company stock. For this reason, we have probably
understated somewhat the willingness of younger and middle-aged workers
to invest in equities on their own.
The distribution of participant investments and asset holdings in these
plans appears in Table I. "Fixed income" investment vehicles account for 28
percent of total assets, which include money market funds, bonds, and
guaranteed interest or stable value funds. "Balanced funds," which include
a combination of bonds and corporate equities, account for another 8 percentofthe assets. Assuming that the funds invested in the balanced funds in
our analysis are roughly evenly split between fixed-income assets and equity
assets, about one-third of the total assets in the 80 plans included here are
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TABU:

1.

401 (k) Assets by Type ofInvestment

Type ofAsset
Fixed income
Balanced fund
Company stock
Domestic equity
International equity
Total

155

Participants
with n,is
Asset Type
61,102
22,190
25,954
65,127
10,675
101,417

Percent
with
This
Asset Type

Total Assets

60.2%
21.9
25.6
64.2
10.5

$538,934,914
157,703,354
309,113,664
855,220,891
44,436,868
1,905,409,691

Percent
ofTotal
Assets

Average
Asset
Balance

28.3%
8.3
16.2
44.9
2.3

$ 5,314
1,555
3,048
8,433
438

100.

18,788

Source: Authors' calculat.iuns.
Note: The data are restricted to pay levels "'=$5,000 and balance "'=$10.

invested in fixed-income instruments, although well over half of the participants in the plans hold such assets. Sixteen percent of the assets is held in
the corporate stock of the plan sponsor, and 47 percent in other equity
funds. By comparison, Access Research, Inc. (1997a) estimates that 20 percent of all 401 (k) assets is invested in guaranteed or stable value funds, 5
percent in money market funds, 7 percent in bonds, and 23 percent in the
stock of the plan sponsor. This suggests that the distribution of assets in om
dataset corresponds fairly closely with the distribution of assets across all
401 (k) plans. Om sample plans average about 1,270 active participants per
plan, with average participant balances of roughly $18,800. By comparison,
Access Research (1997b) estimates that the average 401 (k) balance in 1995
was $31,000, but their plan balances include both employer and employee
financed funds, whereas ours include only the latter.
Table 2 focuses on subsets of the 401 (k) participants by age, namely, those
earning between $5,000 and $15,000, $25,000 and $35,000, and $60,000
and $75,000 per year. These three pay categories bracket the earnings levels
designated as "low," "average," and "maximum" social security actuaries.
The data indicate that higher-wage workers consistently invest a larger share
of their retirement assets in equities than lower-wage workers, and younger
workers consistently invest a larger share of their retirement assets in equities than their older counterparts. Table 3 summarizes equity holding patterns across age groups, and reveals that workers hold a relatively high
fraction of their portfolio in stock, across all pay levels. We also show rates of
equity investments developed by Dickson (1997), used for the Advisory
Council's analysis of personal account accumulations and benefits under
the IA and PSA proposals. Evident.ly, Dickson's investment portfolios assumed a more conservative asset allocation pattern than those of the 401 (k)
participants used in the cmrent analysis?
Dickson (1997) also suggested that annuitization requirements at retire-
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TARl.E

2.401 (k) Assets by Type of Investment, Plan Participant Age, and Earnings
Level
Percent ojAssets by Participant Age
Under 21

Annual earnings less than $15,000
lOA

Fixed income
Balanced fund
Company stock
Domestic equity
International equity

1.7
8.3
77.5
2.1

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

60+

32.0
6.4
2.3
55.2
4.1

36.2
7.8
1.5
52.4
2.1

45.6
8.7
1.3
42.5
1.9

55.0
8.6
2.3
31.9
2.2

59.6
5.9
0.4
31.7
2.3

25.6
6.0
19.8
46.7
1.9

29.7
8.3
18.1
42.0
1.9

34.7
11.1
15.7
36.8
1.7

39.1
14.5
14.0
31.0
1.1

44.3
16.0
11.7
26.8
1.2

13.5
8.9
15.4
57.8
4.4

16.9
10.0
17.7
53.0
2.3

23.7
8.1
17.3
48.8
2. I

31.4
7.5
21.1
38.2

37.3
7.8
11.3
42.7
0.9

Annual earnings $25,000 to $34, 999

Fixed income
Balanced fund
Company stock
Domestic equity
International equity

0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0

A nnual earnings $60,000 to $ 74,999

Fixed income
Balanced fund
Company stock
Domestic equity
International equity

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.8

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The data are restricted to pay levels ;"$5,000 and balance ;"$10.

ment could influence investment of assets during the working career. For
instance, the PSA plan does not require annuitization of personal account
distributions at retirement, whereas the IA plan would require annuitization. As a result, risk-averse individuals might invest more conservatively
toward the end of their working Careers if they are required to annuitize
their asset accumulations at retirement, in order to guard against deterioration in the accrued value of their assets during market downturns. It is
because of this latter reasoning that the stylized portfolios for IA investors
were assumed to be allocated more conservatively at higher ages than those
of the PSA investors.
Comparing Dickson's assumed equity investment patterns in the PSA and
IA plans with the actual pattern of investment by our sample of 401 (k)
investors, we conclude that the earlier analysis of the IA failed to account for
variations in investmen t behavior across earnings classes. As a result, the
previous analysis of these proposals may have been biased. Specifically, the
pattern of more equity investing by workers at higher earnings levels means
that the distribution of investment risk and expected returns vades across
earnings groups. Below we assess how differences in investment behavior
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401 (k) Assets Invested in Equities by Plan Participant Age and Earnings
Level: Actual and Assumed Rates
Pa(l'nt ofAssets in 1'.·quities by Age ofParticipants

2ili

3ili

4ili

5ili

6ili

55.0
55.0

55.0
55.0

52.0
50.0

48.0
40.0

43.0
20.0

64.8
71.4
82.0

59.9
66.1
78.1

50.0
59.7
72.2

40.7
53.6
64.8

37.4
47.7
58.8

Assumed rates

PSA assumed rate
IA assumed rate
,4ctual ratn

Low-wage earner
Average-wage
Maximum-wage

Sources: "Assumed rates" from Advisory COli neil (1997): 171.

across the earnings spectrum affect anticipated investment patterns of the
alternative reform plans.

Expected Investment Returns over Time
One reason that social security privatization plans seem so promising is that
the assumed rates of return on assets accumulated under the proposals
significantly exceed rates of return that will be achieved under the current
system. But rates of return used in these analyses are controversial for at
least three reasons. The first reason pertains to the assumed differential
between the long-term rates of return on financial assets and the rates of
return that accrue under the current system; the second concerns the administrative costs associated with the different reform proposals; and the
third relates to volatility in returns over time and variations in benefits levels
resulting from such volatility. We take up each in turn.

Expected Long-Term Rates of Return Under Alternative
Social Security Approaches
Many analysts contend that today's workers will earn low returns on their
contributions to the social security system. As discussed by Mitchell, Geanakoplos, and Zeldes (this volume). cohorts born after 1940 expect rates of
return below two percent on average. For two-earner couples, expected
returns based on benefits under current law are consistently between 0.3
and 0.4 percentage points higher than they are for single workers, and for
workers with higher earnings levels, projected returns are lower. For single
workers whose earnings are consistently at maximum levels throughout
their careers, the current law returns are consistently below 0.5 percent. Of
course, these returns will not, in fact, be paid since the current social se-
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curity system underfunding means that taxes must rise or benefits must fall
in the future. Either of these changes portends further reductions in the
rates of return, to one percen t or less.
For this reason, personal account proposals that give workers the prospect
of getting historical financial market returns hold out considerable promise. Carter and Shipman (1996) argue that personal account investment
could earn nominal rates of return of 10.5 to 12.5 percent per year, and
Feldstein and Samwick (1997) assume a real rate of 9 percent per year in
simulating their PRA proposal. Dickson (1997, p. 485) estimates that "based
on historical averages, the real expected equity return would be about 9.25
percent per year." The Social Security Advisory Council used 7.0 percent as
its "average" expected annual real rate of return on equities, a rate that
corresponds roughly to the median return on equities over the last 70 years.
For government bonds, the Advisory Council assumed an ultimate longterm real rate of2.3 percent per year. s

Administrative Cost Considerations
Opponents of personal account reform proposals also argue that historical
rates of return cannot be realized because of asset management and record
keeping costs. For example, when a mutual fund company services an IRA
account, it charges roughly $30 to $35 per account per year (Dickson 1997).
This may be especially problematic for millions of workers with small accounts. As an example, consider the case of a student who works 40 hours a
week in the summer at a minimum wage job. Such a workers would earn
roughly $2,600, generating a PSA contribution of about $130 that year.
If he were charged $35 for the management of his account, the charge
would amount to 27 percent of his contributions. Part-time workers who
worked throughout the year would face similar or even larger administrative burdens.
There may be ways to reduce the administrative burdens on small accounts, but the administrative costs are not trivial. A few basis points can
ultimately mean significant differences in retirement accumulations over
the long term. For example, consider a worker who earned $30,000 in her
first year out of school, starting at age 21, and whose pay grew by 1 percent
over inflation each year. Assume that she contributed 5 percent of pay to a
PSA-type account throughout her career and the assets earned returns at a
real rate of 4 percent per year. At age 65, her accumulated balance would be
28 percent larger if she incurred investment expenses of 50 basis points
(bp) per year, than if she incurred expenses of 150 bp per year (note that
100 bp is equivalent to 1.00 percent per year). The difference in the two
balances at age 65 would be equivalent to 85 percent of her final year's
salary.
The Advisory Council's analysis assumed that the annual administrative

Gordon P. Goodfellow and Sylvester J. Schieber

159

fees for the IA plan would be 10.5 basis points per year, and 100 basis points
per year for the PSA plan. Opponent~ of personal account options argue
that the administrative loadings would probably prove to be higher than the
Council's assumed rates if either of the plans were adopted. Mitchell (1998)
has looked at administrative costs in a wide range of public and private
retirement systems both here and elsewhere around the world. She estimates that expense ratios for small and mid-sized 401 (k) plans with an
annuity produC[ generally run at less than 100 bp if the plan offers an index
equity fund, a balanced fund, a fixed income fund, and a money market
fund. She estimates that a PSA-type system that could take advantage of
existing 401 (k) investment options might incur administrative costs of $50
LO $60 per year if there were no annuities involved and an added $100 per
year if an annuity option were included. Assuming a starting annual cost of
$160 per year, with the administrative costs growing at the rate of growth in
wages, lifetime administrative fees in a PSA plan realizing 4 percent real
returns per year would be less than 30 basis points per year for a worker
whose starting salary was $30,000 at age 21. For a worker whose initial pay
level was $10,000 per year and whose wages grow at only 1 percent real per
year, the cost would still be only 80 basis points per year. Using Morningstar
data, Dickson (1997) found that ovel-all alithmetic average of management
expense for mutual funds was 122 bp per year, but the dollar-weighted
average was 93 bp. This suggests that investors are sensitive to management
expenses. Dickson noted that if personal accounts were invested in certificates of deposit and fixed annuities, the administrative costs would be
higher. But he also noted that if administrative expenses were capped at 50
LO 75 bp per year, many financial firms would still offer to manage the
personal accounts under a plan modeled along the lines of the PSA plan.
Our analysis, in the next section, uses the same administrative cost rates
employed by the Advisory Council- that is, 10.5 bp for the IA proposal.' For
the PSA plan from the Advisory Council and another plan that would fully
privatize social security, we use 100 bp as the annual administrative cost.
This, we believe, is a conservative assumption and consistent with Dickson
and Mitchel1. 5

Volatility of Returns

over Time

Another concern about the rate-of-return assumptions used in many assessments of personal account proposals is that they do not recognize return
volatility. For example, Figure 1 shows that the annualized total rates of return on large company stocks have varied considerably over the period 1926
to 1995. Consider the plight of a workel- who hoped to retire at the beginning of 1975, and who had heavily invested in the sLOck market throughout
his career. For such a person, inflation-adjusted returns on large-<ompany
stocks were -21.6 percent in 1973, and -34.5 percent in 1974. The net
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Annual real rate of return
0.6
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0.4
0.3
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•
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1966

1976

1986

1996

Figure 1. Annualized total inflation·acljusted rates of return on large company
slOcks, 1926-95. Source: IbboL"m, R. and Associates (1996).

eBect of this two-year pel;od would have been to cut in half his retirement
assets held as compared to 1972. Of course, this risk is overstated to the
extent that older workers tend to shift assets into fixed-income vehicles. In
any event, the fact that returns do fluctuate over time suggests that a proper
evaluation of alternatives must compare these risks across social security
reform scenarios."

Potential Variation in Benefit Levels Under Alternative
Social Security Reforms
Though no one knows what the future holds, certain financial market relationships have persisted historically. For example, real returns on Treasury
bills are more serially correlated than the returns on stocks. As Fischer
(1983: 153) has noted, "the variance of unexpected real returns on stocks,
looking ahead one month, is about one hundred times the variance of the
unexpected real returns on bills." This is what makes stock investing more
risky in the short term than investing in government T-bills. However,
Table 4 shows that investing in stocks has yielded historical higher returns
than in either T-bills or bonds, particulady over a longer holding period.
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TA OiL"; 4. Investment Performance of Stocks and Bonds by Holding Period
Percent ofTime
Holding
Period

'Ilme Period

Stocks
Outperfurmed
Bonds

Stocks
Outperformed
T-Bills

Bonds
Outperformed
7:Bills

I Year

1802-1992
1871-1982

60.2
59.0

61.3
63.9

49.4
52.5

2 Years

1802-1992
1871-1882

64.7
64.5

64.7
68.6

53.2
58.7

5 Years

1802-1992
1871-1882

69.5
71.2

72.7
74.6

51.9
60.2

10 Years

1802-1992
1871-1882

79.7
82.3

79.1
84.1

52.8
59.3

20 Years

1802-1992
1871-1882

91.3
94.2

94.2
99.0

51.7
59.2

30 Years

1802-1992
1871-1882

99.4
100.0

96.9
100.0

46.9
58.1

Source: Siegel (1994): 31.

Analysts often use historical financial market patterns to model alternative investment strategies and to project future returns under various investment risk/ return scenarios. There are two main modeling approaches used
to assess the implications of alternative investment patterns for participants
in individually managed retirement accounts. The first assumes that historical patterns of returns will be repeated. For example, McCurdy and Shoven
(1992) compare retirement accumulations for workers who invested their
retirement saving entirely in stocks over their working careers with those
who invested it all in bonds. They simulate likely returns by taking 25-, 30-,
35-, and 40-year moving averages of historical returns over the period 1926
through 1989. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1997) use a similar methodology to
project potential accumulations in 401 (k) plans, assuming the workers invested in an all-stock portfolio throughout their careers, an all-bond portfolio, or a portfolio that was half bonds and half stocks. In both cases, the
evidence shows that a strategy of investing all the retirement savings in
stocks consisten tly outperformed a strategy of investing the assets entirely
in bonds.
A different projection approach uses a Monte Carlo model to draw historical return rates randomly from prior periods, assigning them serially to
create a wide range of potential future scenarios. Each of these scenarios is
thought of as representing one possible outcome for a given investment
strategy. The collection of resulting scenarios generates a probability distribution of outcomes under that investment strategy, which along with the
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specification of preference goals allows the selection of optimal invesunent
strategies. This approach has been used by Bajtelsmit,Johnson, and Nugent
(1997) to project potential account balances and retirement benefit levels
under the lA and PSA plans, and to compare them to benefits under a
reform option that would essentially match the benefits promised under
current law. That study did not account for administrative expenses on.<lriations in the invesunent portfolios across workers' life cycles or at varying
earnings levels, improvements that we think are crucial to realistic modeling
of social security reform proposals.

Simulating Outcomes Under Various Social Security
Reform Options
In this section we sim ulate three personal account plans, selected to fall at
different points along the privatization spectrum discussed earlier. The first
has a relatively small portion of total mandated retirement contributions in
a personal account; the second has half of total retirement contributions
in such an account; and the third has all contributions deposited in such
an accoun t. 7
The first plan corresponds to the lA option developed by the Social Security Advisory Council. Here, social security benefits would be gradually
scaled down to fit within the current payroll tax rate of 12.4 percent of
covered payroll that finances Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits. R This plan mandates that workers save
1.6 percent of covered pay on top of the modified OASDI benefit, deposited
into an IA account. This account would be managed by social security or its
agents, giving workers limited ability to direct the investment of their accoun ts across broad index funds representing various segmen ts of the financial markets.
The second plan is the Advisory Council's PSA proposal, under which
disability and early survivors benefits would continue to be financed by the
2.4 percent of covered payrOll that now finances those benefits, administered through the Social Security Administration. Half the remaining
payroll tax (5 percent of covered payroll) would go to finance a flat floor
benefit worth $410 per month (in 1996 dollars) provided to all full-career
workers. This flat benefit would grow over time at the rate of growth of
average wages in the economy. The remainder of the payrOll tax would be
invested in a PSA managed by the worker. Workers over age 55 in 1998
under this proposal would continue to participate in the existing system.
Those between ages 25 and 55 in 1998 would be covered on a prospective
basis under the new system. At retirement, they would receive a combined
benefit based partly on their participation in the current system prior to
1998, and partly on their participation in the reformed system from 1998
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onward. For those 25 years of age or younger in 1998, their full benefit at
retirement would be based on their participation in the reformed system.
The third proposal we examine we call the Full Privatization (FP) plan,
though disability and early survivor benefits would still be provided through
the government as in the PSA proposal. Under the FP plan, the entire 10
percent of covered payroll that now goes to finance retirement benefits
under the Olel-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program would be di\'erted to a personal account managed by the worker in the same t~lshion as
the PSA plan. Consistent with the PSA transition. we assume that workers
over age 55 (in 1998) would continue to be covered under the current
system. Those between ages 25 and 55 (in 1998) would be covered under a
combined system that would provide them a pro rata lifetime benefit based
on their participation in Ule current system until 1998, supplemented by the
benefits financed out of their FP personal account that accumulates between the beginning of 1998 and their retirement at age 65. Those workers
aged 25 and under in 1998 would be fully covered by the new system.
Four birth cohorts covering people born in 1945, 1955, 1965, and 1975
are the focus of the analysis for pl'OtOlypical workers with "low," "average,"
and "maximum" earnings levels. In each case, the simulations assume that
the reform is implcmellled in 1998 and workers retire at age 65. As noted,
we account for administrative expenses and also vary the composition of
investment portfolios over the life cycle and across the wage distribution.
Most of the models assume that accumulated balances in the personal accounts are converted to indexed annuities at age 65 on the same basis as in
the Advisory Council's report. These annuity conversion rates do not include insurance loading factors that would be incurred if annuities were
bought commercially. A final set of simulations does incorporate the cost of
purchasing private annuities,
Investment portfolio allocations for the PSA and FP plan projections
assume that workers at each earnings level would invest in equities at the
rates shown in Table 3. For the IA plan projections, results are adjusted to
account for the forced annuitization of benefits at retirement. We adjusted
by the ratio of assumed IA to PSA investment in equities that was taken from
the top two lines in Table 3.9 This means that the personal account portfolios are somewhat more conservative for workers above age 40 for the IA
projections than they are for the PSA and FP projections.
Monte Carlo simulations use nominal rates of return and inflation rates
from a Watson Wyatt Asset Modeling system used for projecting investment
scenarios for pension plan sponsors. The underlying assumptions in these
simulations do not directly parallel the historical return patterns imbedded
in the 1926-95 period used in the prior simulations. The expected risk-free
rcal rate of return is significantly higher than that observed hiswrically over
the long term, 1,7 percent versus 0.6 percent. In addition, the expected risk
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5.

COlllpoun~

Average Returns over :,e1ecLed Historical Periods
Time Pniod (pnrml)

70ymrs
/926-/995

45 years
/95/-/995

25 years
/97/-1995

lOymrs
/986-1995

InflaLion raLe

3.1

4.1

.~.6

3.5

Treasury bill raLe
Real T-bill raLc

3.7
0.6

5.2

7.0
1.4

5.6
2.1

Large-cap stock raLes
Reali-cap stock rates
L-cap stock minus T-bill

10.5
7.4
6.8

12.2
R.1
7.0

12.2
6.6
5.2

14.1'
lUI
9.2

Small-cap slOck raLes
Real s-cap slOck rates
S-Cap sLack minus T-bill

12.5
9.4
R.R

] 4.5
W.4
9.3

15.5
9.9
8.5

11.9
8.4
6.3

Intermediate gov't bonds
Real imcrm gov't bonds
1m gov't bonds minus T-bill

5.3
1.6

6.4
2.3
1.2

9.0
3.4
2.0

9.1
5.6
3.5

Long-term gov't bonds
Real L-T gov't bond rates
L-T gov't bonds minus T-bill

5.2
2.1
1.5

5.8
1.7
0.6

9.6
4.0
2.6

11.9
8.4
6.3

2.2

1.1

Source: Ibbol,on. R. and Associates (lYY6).

premiums for each asset class are generally lower than the observed historical risk premiums. We believe this is defensible because the capital ma.-ket
experience of the last 10 to 15 years suggests that the real risk-free rate has
risen significantly. The rise in the real risk-free rate can be directly observd
from the level of short-term interest rates - e.g., 30-day US Treasury bills as
shown in Table 5 - which carry a minimum risk premium for unanticipated
inflation. This measure of the real risk-free rate has averaged 1.4 percent
over the last 25 years and 2.1 percent over the past 10 years, compared to 0.6
percent over the period from 1926 through 1995. Higher levels in recent
years can be attributed to tight monetary policies and society's willingness
or unwillingness to save at historical rates. The expected compound average
return on large-capital stocks is assumed to be 9.2 percent (5.7 percent real)
with a standard deviation of 17.5 percent. This compares with a historical
ave I-age of 10.5 percent per year (7.4 percent real) over the 70-year period
from 1926 to 1995, as shown in Table 5. Real returns are expected to be
somewhat lower in this sector than the historical averages, because we are
currently in one of the longest sustained bull markets in history. In addition,
we helieve that it makes sense to be conservative in estimating potential
returns in this sector because of the concerns that some people have raised
about the possible pricing effects on stocks when the baby boomers begin to
liquidate their lifetime savings during their retirement period (e.g., see
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Schieber and Shoven 1996). In developing the projections presented here,
the expected return on small-capital stocks is 7.3 percent real versus 9.4
percent for the historicallong-t.erm rate,
vVhile stock ret.urns used in t.he simulation are somewhat. lower than those
actllally experienced over t.he 70-year period 1926-9~, t.he ret.urns on bonds
are somewhat higher than hist.orical averages - 0.5 percen t per year. This
reflects the higher returns on risk-free assets in recent. years and also wariness about government's abilit.y to deal with the aging of the baby boom and
their' potential claims on government budgets. Although public policymakers have made significant progress on balancing the federal budget on a
current. cash basis, they have not yet significantly addressed the long-term
fiscal imbalances in entitlement. programs. Over the last. decade, unfunded
liabilities calculat.ed on an ongoing basis for social securit)' alone have risen
by se\'eral hundred billion dollars more than has t.he federal debt. The
unfunded liabilities in Medicare have risen by even great.er amounts. Until
these liabilities are addressed, long-term government bond rat.es are likely
to stay above hist.oricallong-term rates,
Model simulations generat.ed 500 scenarios of returns for t.hree invest.ment vehicles over an 80-year period. The investment vehicles arc equities,
bonds, and short-term fixed investments best charact.erized as money market funds, The equity returns are based on a blend of75 percent large-cap
stocks and 25 percent small-eap stocks, The bond return is based on an
assumed 50-50 blend of intermediate government and corporate bond returns, and the money market return a blend of the returns on short-term
fixed-income investments. The compound average returns over t.he 500
simulations were ~,5 percent per year on the money market funds (1.5
percent real) with a standard deviation of 1.9 percent, 7.6 percent on t.he
bond funds (3.6 percent real) with a standard deviation of 7.5 percent. and
10,8 percent on the stock funds (6,8 percent real) with a standard deviation
of 7.~ percen t.

Projection Results and Analysis
The simulations presented next use a Monte Carlo model that generates
investment returns with a variance distribution consistent. with U.S. historical patterns. \II

Basefine Projections
Projections for a low-eamings worker born in 1965 appear in Figure 2. The
various panels reflect the cumulative probability dist.ribution ofbenelits that
would be provided under the three reform plans. The top left.-hand panel
shows the distribution of pre-tax benefi ts expected under the LA: for inst.ance, there is a 50 percent probability t.hat expected benefits would be
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Figure 2. Distribution of expected benefit levels under the PSA and IA plans for 1965
birth cohorts, workers with low lifetime earnings. Source: Authors' calculations.

roughly $7,700. The range of benefits across the whole probability distribution goes from around $7,200 to $9,200. The top left-hand panel shows the
distribution of projected pre-tax benellts under the simulated PSA plan. In
this case the PSA projected benefits exceed the benefits provided by the IA
plan in roughly 92 percent of the simulations: projected benefits at the 50
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percent probability level are $8,200 for the PSA plan, versus $7,700 for the
IA plan. At the bottom end of the probability distribution, there is some
added downside risk in the PSA plan which would provide only a $6,800
benefit versus $7,200 for the IA plan. Conversely there is significantly
greater upside potential with a maximum benefit under the PSA plan of
around $14,000, versus $9,200 under the IA plan. Eliminating the extreme
tails of the two distributions, in 95 percent of the simulated outcomes the
PSA benefits fall between $7,100 and $10,500, and the IA benefits between
$7,300 and $8,400. For this worker, the PSA plan would seem to offer considerable upside gain, without large added downside risk.
The bottom left-hand panel in Figure 2 adds the FP plan pre-tax benefit
pattern. At the 50 percent probability level, the FP and PSA plan provide
essentially the same benefit. In about half the cases, the FP benefit would be
considerably above that of the PSA plan, but in the other half it would be
considerably lower. The FP benefit exceeds the IA benefit in roughly 60
percent of the simulations. While the FP plan provides much greater upside
potential than either of the other plans, it would do so at the cost of adding
substantial downside risk for this particular worker.
All three plans may be compared to current law (CLl benefits in the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 2. Of course, current law benefits cannot be
paid unless additional taxes are raised. Another reference level in the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 2 represents estimated pretax benefit that
could be maintained under the current OASDl payroll tax I"ate. This particular benefit, called the "Maintain Tax Rate" (MTR) benefit level, is exactly
equal to the benefit provided under the defined benefit element of the IA
plan. As noted earlier, the MTR benefit would redistribute social security
benefits somewhat differently across the earnings spectrum than CUlTent
law because it would reduce benefits more for workers with higher earnings
than for those at lower earnings levels. While other patterns of benefit
reductions could be developed to live within the current financing rates,
this is at least as good a model for comparing policy alternatives as any other.
The two horizontal lines in Figure 2 and subsequent figures can be
thought of as defining the range of policy options for redefining benefits
within the context of the current structure of social security. The top line
assumes that all adjustments to current policy will be made on the financing
side by raising revenues. The bottom line assumes that all adjustments to
current policy will be made on the benefit side by reducing expenditures.
Alternative projections for workers at the low-, average-, and maximumearnings levels are olTered in Figures 3, 4, and 5 respectively, where each
figure shows the results of a complete set of projections for a different birth
cohorts. All benefits are shown on a pre-tax basis. All of the plans simulated
assume that the reform would be implemented in 1998, so workers in the
1945 birth cohort would participate in the reformed systems between 10
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Figure 3. Distribution of expected benefit ier,els uncler tl-re psA ancl IA plans
for selected birth cohorts, 'n'orkers rvith lol' lifetirne earninss. Source: Authors'
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Fisure 5. Distribution of expected benefit ler.els uncler the PSA ancl LA. plans fbr
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corlsiderable downside risk for rvorkers with lorv earninss levels. As.rve rvill
for ruorkers with low
earnings rvho consistently invest conservativelv throughor,rt their workins
shorv lateq these dorvnside risks become even greater

li'es. The PSA plan performs as well or better than the IA in about 90
percent of the sirnulations for the 1955 and subsequent birth col.rorts. For
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workers with average and maximum earnings levels throughout their careers, the PSA plan would generally provide a level of benefits superior to
the IA plan for all but the earliest cohorts affected by the plans. The FP plan,
on the other hand, appears to create mostly upside opportunities relative to
either the IA or PSA plans.
One issue not addressed in this chapter is the issue of transition costs that
the various proposals would create. These are addressed at some length by
the Advisory Council (∞ΩΩπ), by Feldstein and Samwick (∞ΩΩπ), and by
Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (this volume). Advocates of the PSA
proposed an explicit increase in the payroll tax of ∞.∑≤ percent of covered
payroll plus some transitional borrowing over a π≠-year period to cover
these costs. Feldstein and Samwick would cover the transition costs for their
proposal by a similar taxing mechanism, although their transition costs
would be somewhat hidden in that they merely propose the personal account benefit be funded up to a level that matches the benefits provided by
social security under current law. The point is that while the FP plan would
provide a superior benefit to the PSA, IA, or current law benefit for most
workers at or above average earnings levels, there may be substantial transition costs associated with the provision of such benefits.
Figures ∂ and ∑ support the approach that Feldstein and Samwick have
taken in developing their proposal. These results suggest that there would
be considerable room in the transition to a fully privatized system to use
some of the current contribution rates for workers with average earnings or
higher to pay transition costs for getting out of the current system. This
would be accomplished by using a portion of the contributions from such
workers to pay transition costs directly, leaving the remainder of their contributions to fund a personal account benefit in line with current law benefit
levels. These results also suggest that there might be some flexibility to
develop a redistributive mechanism on the contributory side of a fully privatized system, where workers with higher earnings levels would have some
portion of their contributions redistributed to those with lower earnings.
These redistributed contributions could be used by the workers with lower
earnings to offset the downside risks they would suffer under a fully privatized system, as discussed above.

Benefit Projections for Conservative Investors
Simulations thus far assume that workers will invest in accordance with the
patterns shown in Table ≥. We believe these are reasonable assumptions on
average, but some workers will be more conservative investors throughout
their lives. For this reason, we have computed the fraction of workers who
invested ∫≠ percent of more of their ∂≠∞(k) money in fixed income investment vehicles during ∞ΩΩ∑. The results show that while low-wage workers are
somewhat more likely to invest conservatively than those with higher earn-
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Table 6. ∂≠∞(k) Plan Participants Holding ∫≠ to ∞≠≠ Percent of Self-Directed Plan
Balances in Fixed-Income Assets, by Earnings Level
Percent of Participants by Earnings Level
Participant’s
Age

Under
$∞∑,≠≠≠

$≤∑,≠≠≠ to
$≥∂,ΩΩΩ

$∏≠,≠≠≠ to
$π∂,ΩΩΩ

≤≠s
≥≠s
∂≠s
∑≠s
∏≠s

∞∫.∑
≤≠.≥
≤≥.≥
≥≤.≥
∂≠.∏

∞≥.∂
∞Ω.∂
≤∂.≤
≤∫.∫
≥≥.Ω

∑.∑
∫.∂
∞≤.Ω
∞∑.π
≤∑.π

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The data are restricted to pay levels ?$∑,≠≠≠ and balance ?$∞≠.

ings, there are also many higher-paid workers who would invest quite conservatively over their whole careers (see Table ∏).
How would our results change if we assumed the worker invested all of his
retirement savings in bonds over his entire working life? Results under the
PSA and the IA proposals (Figure ∏) are more similar to each other than in
the earlier presentations, and there is a relatively smaller probability of
achieving benefit levels comparable to those in current law. The downside
risks are greater under the FP plan for all birth cohorts than in the earlier
simulations. These results suggest that the potential beneficial effects of
funding under a range of personal account plans can largely be offset by
failure to diversify investments. But new financial products may be developed that could make even risk-averse individuals better off under personal
account proposals than the results shown in Figure ∏. For example, a product that provided a guaranteed rate of return over a specified investment
period, but still allowed the investor to participate in some share of the
upside benefit of higher returns if the market performs better than the
return guarantee, could provide an acceptable floor for accumulations for
risk-averse investors.
Table π shows the potential benefits that workers could achieve if they
participated in such an investment program, when the real annual return
on their personal account investments is ≥ percent. Under the IA plan, the
first three cohorts would receive benefits comparable to those under current law, and the PSA plan would out-perform current law in every case. The
FP plan would provide benefits consistently ∏≠ to ∞≠≠ percent higher than
the PSA plan. Part of the challenge in crafting a personal account proposal
for reforming social security is to find creative ways to deal with the problems that can arise under such approaches. If future long-term financial
market returns can approach the levels we have experienced over the past
century, there should be considerable room to guarantee investors real
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Table 7. Benefit Levels Under Alternative Social Security Reform Scenarios
Assuming ≥ Percent Real Returns Per Year on Individual Accounts (∞ΩΩπ
dollars)
Birth Cohort

CL

PSA

IA

FP

∏,∏≠∑
∏,≤Ω∞
∏,∏∑≥
π,≤π≥

π,≠≥∏
π,∫∏≥
∞≠,∂≥π
∞∂,∫Ω≠

∏,∫Ω≤
π,≠∑∏
∫,≤∫∞
∞≠,∂∞≠

∞≥,Ω≤∫
∞∂,Ω∞Ω
∞∫,π∞∫
≤∑,≥≠≠

∞≠,π≠∑
Ω,∫≠≤
Ω,Ω∑π
∞≠,∫∫≥

∞∞,∂∫≠
∞≥,≠≥≠
∞π,Ω≥Ω
≤∏,∫π≤

∞∞,≥∂≥
∞∞,∑≠≤
∞≥,∑π≥
∞π,∫∑∑

≤≤,∫≤≥
≤∂,∑≥≤
≥∞,∑∞≤
∂∂,π≤π

Workers with maximum taxable earnings
∞Ω∂∑
∞π,∂≥Ω
∞∏,≤∑∫
∞Ω∑∑
≤≠,≠∫∏
∞∑,≠π∞
∞Ω∏∑
≤∞,≤∂≥
∞∂,Ω∂≠
∞Ωπ∑
≤≥,πΩ≥
∞∏,≤Ω∞

∞∫,∏≥∫
≤≥,∫∂Ω
≥∑,π∏∞
∑π,≥∑∞

∞π,πΩ∂
∞Ω,∞∑∏
≤≥,∏≤≠
≥≥,≠∞∑

≥∏,∂≥≤
∂≥,≠≠∑
∑Ω,≥∫∞
Ω≠,≥∏∏

Workers with low earnings
∞Ω∂∑
∏,∫∫∂
∞Ω∑∑
π,∏≥Ω
∞Ω∏∑
∫,≠∏∏
∞Ωπ∑
Ω,≠∏≠
Workers with average earnings
∞Ω∂∑
∞∞,≥∏∫
∞Ω∑∑
∞≤,∏∞∫
∞Ω∏∑
∞≥,≥≤∞
∞Ωπ∑
∞∂,Ω∏≠

MTR

Source: Authors’ calculations.

returns in the range of ≥ or ∂ percent and still leave considerable margin for
the institutions that provide the vehicles.

The Tax Treatment of Benefits Under the Alternative Proposals
Thus far all of our simulations have been pre-tax, but the reform proposals
differ significantly in how benefits would be taxed at distribution. For example, the Advisory Council’s MB and IA plans would subject to income tax all
benefits above workers’ contribution amounts. The personal account benefit under the IA plan would be afforded consumption tax treatment—i.e.,
the contributions would be made on a pre-tax basis and benefits would not
be taxed at distribution. In the case of the PSA plan, all benefits would be
accorded consumption tax treatment. Benefits financed by employer contributions would be taxed when the benefit is paid because the employer
contributions was a tax-deductible expense when made. Benefits financed
by employee contributions would be financed with post-tax earnings and
would not be subject to further income taxation when paid.
To illustrate how alternative tax treatments affect projected benefits, we
assumed that ∫∑ percent of the benefits provided through OASDI would be
taxable at a ∞∑ percent marginal rate for the MB, IA, and MTR plans. For the
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PSA plan, we assumed that ∑≠ percent of the old benefit earned prior to
∞ΩΩ∫ would be taxable and that ∞≠≠ percent of the new flat benefit earned
under the reform plan would be taxable at a ∞∑ percent marginal rate.
Under the PSA proposal, half the old benefit and all the flat benefit would
be financed by pre-tax employer contributions. Under this proposal, the
share of total benefits financed with pre-tax contributions would be accorded consumption tax treatment, which is consistent with the tax preferences accorded virtually all private employer-sponsored pension. Because
half of the old OASDI benefit is financed by post-tax employee contributions, and all of the personal account benefit is financed by post-tax dollars,
half the old OASDI benefit and none of the personal account benefit would
be taxable under the PSA plan. Taxation of the FP benefit follows the same
rules; thus ∑≠ percent of it would be taxable at a ∞∑ percent rate. The results
of the modified benefit distributions are shown in Figure π.
Comparing the distributions in Figure ∑ with those in Figure π shows the
differing tax effects; Table ∫ summarizes the changes in the probabilities
that the PSA plan will exceed the current law (CL) and IA benefits on a preand post-tax basis (note that the post-tax benefits are labeled CL%, IA%, and
so forth in the figures and table). The differential tax effects are important.
In relative terms, the effects are greater for the older cohorts than for the
younger ones. While we have not extended the analysis to the maximumwage workers, the improvement in net benefits under the PSA plan relative
to the CL or IA plans would be even greater than for workers at average
earnings levels.

Implications of Annuitization Fees on Benefit Levels
One of the concerns about reforming social security through creation of
personal accounts is that the cost of annuitization will significantly deplete
the advantages of higher rates of returns that workers can achieve through
the funding of their retirement benefits. To address this concern, we developed projections that include a charge for the purchase of an annuity at
retirement. Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (∞ΩΩΩ) have estimated that,
on average, individual annuity policies delivered payouts valued at between
∫≠ and ∫∑ cents on the premium dollar paid in ∞ΩΩ∑. They found that the
best plans offered at that time had payouts of slightly above Ω≠ cents on the
premium dollar. This load was used in conjunction with post-tax projections
for workers with average earnings. While ∞≠ percent is below the average
prevailing now, Mitchell et al’s work suggests that these markets are becoming increasingly efficient. In addition, we believe that there would be further
cost pressure on these markets if the demand for annuitization increases.
Results for the PSA and FP plans including annuity loadings appear in
Figure ∫, labeled PSA& and FP&. It is interesting that the pattern of PSA
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Figure 7. Projected post-tax ber-refrt ler,els under the PSA and LA pl:urs f<rr selected
birth cohorts, u'orkers I'ith average lif-etime earnings. Source: Authors' calculations.
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benefits does not chanse much fioln those'without annuit,v loadinss. The
reason is that at the lower end of the PSA benefit distributions, the flat
benefit still pror,ided through the OASDI program is relativelv sisnificant.
Since the flat benefit is not subject to the annuitv loading, the loacling rate
on the total benefit is significantll' ameliorated. At thc hisher end of the
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Table 8. Probability that PSA Benefit Exceeds the MB and IA Benefit for Worker
with Average Career Earnings: Pre-Tax versus Post-Tax Computation
P(PSA]MB)
∞Ω∂∑ birth cohort
∞Ω∑∑ birth cohort
∞Ω∏∑ birth cohort
∞Ωπ∑ birth cohort

P(PSA]IA)

Pre-tax

Post-tax

Pre-tax

Post-tax

≠.∞π
≠.∞≤
≠.∑≤
≠.∏π

≠.Ω∂
≠.≥∂
≠.π≤
≠.ππ

≠.≤∑
≠.π≤
≠.∫∞
≠.π≤

≠.ΩΩ
≠.Ω∑
≠.Ω∞
≠.∫≠

Source: Authors’ calculations.

distribution, the portion of the benefit financed by the personal account
becomes much more significant. As this occurs, the annuity loading takes
on greater significance, but it does so at benefit levels where the PSA tends
to significantly outperform the other policy options, and it is not sufficient
to overwhelm that improved performance.
The situation for the FP benefits is slightly different than under the PSA
plan. For the ∞Ω∂∑ birth cohort, the PSA plan would provide higher benefits
than the FP plan over a larger portion of the probability distribution where
annuitization costs are considered. The downside risks in the FP plan are
somewhat greater as well. In the other cases, the annuitization of benefits
would dampen somewhat the superiority of the FP benefit over the PSA
benefit or benefits provided under the alternative policy options. The explanation for this effect is that the FP benefit would subject a larger share of
total benefits to private market annuitization costs than any of the other
plans. In any event, the FP plan would generally provide a superior benefit
to the other options for most workers born during or after the mid-∞Ω∑≠s.
While this analysis of annuitization costs and options could be more extensive, it suggests that some of the concerns about annuity costs relative to
personal account options may be overblown.

An Alternative Perspective on Risk and Retirement
Benefit Levels
Critics of personal account options point to variations in market returns
over time as one of the primary reasons they oppose such plans. The implication is that personal account options include benefit risks and that the
traditional defined-benefit structure of the current system does not have
such risks. But this is not a fair conclusion. While the risks under the various
models have a somewhat different nature and might be distributed differently, neither is free of the risk that expected levels of benefits might not
be achieved for some workers. For instance, current-law benefit levels can
only be achieved if taxed are raised substantially. Social security actuaries
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estimate that the payroll tax rate tvould have to rise 2.5 percentage points to
eliminate the current actuarial imbalance in OASDI financing and create a
sufficient reserve so the trust fund balance would be stable at the end of the

75-year projection period (Goss, this volume). Conversell', personal accounts would expose lvorkers to greater financial market risks in the ac-

Gordon P. Goodfellow and Sylvester J. Schieber

179

cumulation of their base pensions than they now face. Personal accounts
held under many reform proposals would be sensitive to the tides of those
markets. It is not clear that the overall risks of a system of funded personal
accounts would be any greater than they are in the current environment of
unfunded political promises.∞∞ There is no way to cover the real deficit that
exists in the current system without incurring some real costs. If the only way
policymakers can get society to bear these costs is to hide them, this increases the chances that current promises will not be met. The current
difference in benefit promises and financing rates in social security is so
large that it is not conceivable that policymakers can conceal the cost of
closing it.
One way to evaluate the tradeoffs between political and financial risks is
to see what happens to the majority of people under various policy options.
For example, consider the average-wage worker born in ∞Ω∂∑ (Figure ∂).
Under the IA plan, required contributions would have to rise about twothirds as much as the increase in the payroll tax required to secure currentlaw benefits. That is, if we raised the payroll tax today, by ∞.∏ percent, this
takes us ≤/≥ of the distance needed to eliminate the actuarial deficit and
stabilize the trust fund. For the ∞Ω∂∑ birth cohort of average workers, the
MTR benefit is $∞≠,π≠∑ in ∞ΩΩπ dollars, and their current-law benefit is
$∞∞,≥∏∫ (under the assumptions used in developing our analytic comparisons). If an added ∞.∏ percent of covered payroll were raised in taxes
and it was distributed on a pro rata basis relative to the differences between
the current law and MTR benefits within the current benefit structure, the
new expected benefit level would be $∞∞,∞≤Ω—that is, ∏∂ percent of the way
toward the current law benefit going from the MTR benefit level. Looking
back to Figure ∂ for the benefit projection for a worker born in ∞Ω∂∑ and
with average earnings, under the IA reform proposal there is an ∫∞ percent
probability the worker would get a benefit in excess of $∞∞,∞≤Ω under the IA
plan. While it is hard to guess at what rate workers might be willing to trade
political risk for financial market risk, our guess is that many workers in the
situation just described would prefer one of the personal account policy
proposals to either the MTR option or one that would have them simply pay
higher taxes to support the current system.

Conclusion
Social security reform plans that include a personal account are sometimes
criticized because of costs and risks associated with these proposals. This
chapter shows that there is considerable variability in the way people invest
across the earnings spectrum, variability that should be considered when
evaluating such proposals. We have also shown that administrative costs
matter and that historical volatility in financial market returns would probably lead to some considerable dispersion of benefits within and across co-
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horts. Our analyses rest on defensible assumptions that address criticisms of
earlier studies.
We find that most baby boomers will not receive their money’s worth
under social security for any policy option examined here, including the
PSA option. Some baby boomers may have reduced benefit levels relative to
current law promises, and these cuts are likely to be largest for the middle
cohorts of the baby boomers. In the long term, though, our projections
suggest that social security reforms including some level of personal account funding would lead to improved benefit levels for significant segments of future retiree populations. While our analysis does not consider
possible potential macroeconomic effects that might arise if a personal account reform option were adopted, we are confident that higher savings
rates would contribute to general improvements in worker and retiree welfare over time.
Our analysis also suggests that the greater the level of privatization and
funding of the social security system under a reform plan, the greater the
potential to raise benefits or reduce costs for workers in the broad middle
class and higher earnings levels. Moving to a program heavily reliant on
personal accounts without putting in place some form of redistribution or
floor of protection at the lower end of the earnings distribution, however,
would expose some workers to the risks of significantly lower benefits than
they would receive under current law or alternatives that maintain some sort
of floor of protection. Those exposed to these risks would be those most
vulnerable to a retirement of poverty level incomes.
Our analysis of the implications of annuity costs suggests that the costs
associated with private annuitization may not be as large a factor in determining the relative merits of personal account approaches to social security
reform versus more traditional defined benefit approaches as previously
thought. This does not mean that the issue of mandatory annuitization up
to some appropriate income level is not important or worthy of consideration. Further analysis of the annuitization issues should be undertaken to
improve the understanding of the potential implications of personal account reforms to social security.
Finally, we have documented the implications of financial market risks on
the distribution of benefits under three specific personal account social
security reform models. Those critical of personal accounts might take solace from our results showing that not everyone will come out with higher
benefit levels under such policy approaches than under current social security provisions. But we assert that current law is not the appropriate standard against which to compare viable policy options. No one today is seriously suggesting that policymakers will ultimately raise taxes sufficiently to
pay current promises. Until the risks associated with the unfunded political
promises in the current system are factored into the analysis, there can

Gordon P. Goodfellow and Sylvester J. Schieber

181

be no fair assessment of the relative desirability of personal account approaches to social security reform.
The authors wish to thank David Gordon and Tomeka Hill for their help in
developing the simulations presented here. We also wish to thank Olivia
Mitchell for her helpful comments, to Martin Feldstein who invited us to
present our research to a NBER conference on social security where the
comments and discussion helped us in the development of our analytical
approach, and to John Shoven for encouraging us to add a full privatization
option to our analysis. Findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this
paper represent the views of the authors and not those of Watson Wyatt
Worldwide or any of its other associates.
Notes
∞. About half of the plans are administered by Watson Wyatt with the remainder
administered by another plan vendor.
≤. In developing stylized portfolios, Dickson considers both ∂≠∞(k) and IRA investment patterns. In his analysis, he notes that IRA investment patterns tend to be
somewhat more conservative than those for ∂≠∞(k) plans and half of all IRA assets
are owned by individuals over the age of ∏≠, whereas nearly π≠ percent of ∂≠∞(k)
assets are concentrated in accounts of workers between the ages of ∂≠ and ∑Ω. He
attributes part of the difference to the distribution of assets in the two types of plans
to the age of the asset holders. He also notes that individuals tend to allocate an ever
larger portion of their assets to fixed income assets as they age. The large concentration of IRA assets among the elderly suggests that much of the IRA money is held by
people already retired. Since the focus of the current analysis is on investment
patterns of workers, we do not believe that the investment patterns in IRAs are as
relevant as those of ∂≠∞(k) participants.
≥. Whether these real returns are the correct ones to use is discussed by Mitchell,
Geanakoplos, and Zeldes (this volume).
∂. Mitchell’s analysis of TIAA/CREF suggests that this plan’s costs might run ≤≠ to
≥≠ basis points per year with some added costs on the annuity provisions, but the IA
proposal as structured with monolithic government management of the system
might drive such cost rates down considerably. In addition, the ∞≠.∑ basis points for
IA administration is consistent with Dickson’s analysis of mutual fund administration
costs. For example, in a world of ∂ percent inflation with an initial annual $≥∑ per
account administrative cost growing at the rate of inflation, with ∑ percent wage
growth, and ≥ percent real returns on assets over a worker’s career for a worker
starting to work at age ≤∞ and working until reaching age ∏∑, administrative costs as a
percentage of assets managed would average ∞π.≤ basis points per year for a worker
whose starting salary was $∞≤,≠≠≠ per year, ∫.≥ basis points for one with a starting
salary of $≤∑,≠≠≠, and ∑.≤ basis points for one at $∂≠,≠≠≠ per year.
∑. Since the government could limit administrative loadings for small accounts, a
case could be made that the ∞≠≠ bp we assume is an upper bound on costs.
∏. This concern was partially addressed in the Advisory Council on Social Security’s report by presenting alternative projections where workers were assumed to
invest only in government bonds throughout their careers, or alternatively, where
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they were assumed to invest only in stocks with annual administrative costs of only ∑≠
basis points per year. The former was assumed to provide an estimate of the potential
outcome for a worker who realized relatively low career returns and the latter was
considered an estimate of a high-return scenario. Under this approach, there is no
way to estimate the probability of one or the other outcomes or how they might
actually distribute around benefits promised by current law or some alternative level
of defined benefit promise.
π. The first two proposals are described in detail in the Advisory Council’s final
report (∞ΩΩπ) and the third is a variant on the second proposal.
∫. Under this proposal, the scaling back of benefits would be skewed toward workers with higher lifetime earnings levels. Those at the low end of the earnings spectrum would experience relatively small reductions of their basic OASDI benefits.
Ω. This adjustment keeps our assumed ratio of equities to fixed-income investment
equivalent to the ratio of equities to fixed-income investments in the Advisory Council’s comparative analysis of the IA and PSA plans.
∞≠. Results from additional projections are available from the authors on request.
∞∞. Some critics of personal retirement accounts point to the potential for financial market collapse as a reason to stay with the current social security structure. Of
course, a wage-based, pay-as-you-go system would also be badly affected by the collapse of financial markets.
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